Described as a 'modest non-technical book for general readers', this is a remarkable success in exposing ethical problems about people. The style is transparently lucid, carefully expository and subtly humorous. An immense array of historical, philosophical and literary scholarship is used, with life experiences, in a 1ight and open way which draws a reader on. The exposition of ethical dilemmas is deep, and carefully meticulous without burden, thanks to elegant language and illustration. An easy read indeed.

Careful exposition occupies the first two thirds. One looks to the rest for some good solutions; there are some indeed, but others are weak or questionable. So, a parson's egg, but extremely good in many parts.

The account begins with and refers back to two hard cases, the tragedies of Tony Bland and abortion. Others might have lacked such courage and started with 'normal' persons. The perspectives presented are postmodernism, science, consciousness, the role of language, evolutionary theory and theology. The first chapter deals with denying personality, dictators' techniques, illustrated from Lewis Carroll, Nietsche, Kafka and post-modern 'demolitions'. The freedom issue figures prominently. Then Hillsborough; how may the possession of brainstem but not cortex constitute a person? There are long preliminary glances towards embryos and disabled persons. Factors which condition 'persons' are described - culture and communication - with that central problem of personal development, gradu-alist versus instantist acquisition of 'personhood'.

Then another key problem for today: is 'personhood' atomised independence or mutuality? There is an excellent presentation of the history of ideas from Greek and Roman projections on. Here the origins and pivotal importance of the Trinity to the 'person' idea are exposed. 'Person' lacks self evident meaning; like a stocking it takes the shape of the packing. Trinity defines person, not vice versa; the 'image of God' concept contributes strongly; 'knowing God' is relation to him, not imagining him. 'Personhood' is evident to self. 'I AM THAT I AM' is self-existence; we are the same. There is a splendid critique of 'self-realisation' and 'self-fulfilment' philosophies. Descartes' dualism and Pascal's critique, and the importance (seen now, not then) of 'webs' and 'net-working' are explained. (Cognosco ergo sum would have been wiser, Descartes.) 'Person' is largely recognisable by relationship, human and divine.

The mind-brain problem is presented, lucidly; 'emergence' is organised complexity; dualism and reductionism demolished (with Dennett), excellent stuff.

But there are some problems; the 'Word of God' is presented, but with a seeming implication which does not cohere with its biblical context. Its meaning is seen as the role of language in the declaration of personhood; but scripture presents this as divine authority, creative revelation, 'Godhead'; about how God declared personhood not singly about the importance to personal identity of declaration.

An evolutionary view of man is pervasive; we are told that this rules out a 'fall' (odd, in a text about persons and their relations to creation). The basic view is 'Darwinian' throughout in that it gives reason and observation prior place, at times alone. 'Miracle' has no place in personal evolution; God is not permitted to speak about who are persons, even if what he has said is analysed; the stance is 'observer' not 'listener' oriented. There appear to be two logical concerns here: if 'person' transcends observation, is greater than the body and its parts, then how is this entity recognised by observation? And if transcendent, why can't the revelation in scripture of I AM be authoritative for 'I am'? Is this a new version of 'God of the gaps'? Is what we can't explain what we are, persons? In presenting this view of the Word, does Habgood saw off his sedile?

This style follows; what it is to be a Christian is said to be 'an invitation to share an exploration of the human condition in the light of Christ . . .' Man again is agent, not God. But the 'on and up' Teilhard and Huxley view of evolution is demolished well, albeit on evolutionary grounds, not scripture. Paul, it seems, was seriously wrong about 'original sin'. But we do have the resurrection (with apologies, its is the only miracle to be mentioned).

So, with this background we draw near to memory loss, to personality change, to PVS, to embryo loss and research, to abortion. The key arguments are gradualism, scientific fact, 'attributes' (cell differentiation into embryo and 'support services') and therapeutic intent. Genetic impact is discussed particularly well. But even if it were agreed that scripture can be taken variously on the earliest embryos or on the brainstem, there is a curious failure to record the clear scriptural statements about 'normal' persons, whether children in- or ex-utero, the elderly or the infirm. The key to understanding 'persons' is said to be 'theology'; God's personal revelations about it don't seem to figure. Again, oddly, the problem of 'attributes' is presented simply as the impossibility of knowing them in the grossly diminished (Tony Bland), not for the genuinely theological if debatable reasons adduced by, for example, O'Donovan.

Reviewed by
Duncan Vere
(Emeritus Professor of Therapeutics, University of London)